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1.  Introduction 
This paper explores the emergence of a distinctive energy 
policy for Scotland and raises the issue of the desirability of 
any differentiation from UK energy policy. This requires an 
examination of both UK and Scottish energy policies, 
although we adopt a rather broad-brush overview rather 
than a very detailed analysis.  
 
The rationale for a distinctive Scottish energy policy reflects 
the rationale for devolution per se, namely to ensure that 
such policy better reflects the local knowledge and 
preferences of the Scottish people. However, the 
devolution settlement itself did not initially appear to allow 
much scope for pursuing a distinctive energy policy in 
Scotland since most of the main powers under this heading 
were reserved to Westminster. Nonetheless, this paper 
argues that the Scottish Government is now pursuing an 
energy policy that is different in a number of important 
respects from the policy of the UK. Furthermore, this is not 
simply a feature of the recently elected minority SNP 
government: although the policy differences may now be 
rather more sharply drawn, they were certainly apparent 
under previous administrations. 
 
Exploration of any distinctiveness in Scottish energy policy 
requires a comparison of Scottish and UK energy policies. 
We employ the traditional framework for analysing policy in 
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general, and energy policy in particular (e.g. RSE, 2006, 
chpt. 4), to conduct this comparative analysis. This 
framework recognises that any energy policy in the present 
UK institutional setup operates in the context of liberalised 
energy markets. In this context energy policy instruments 
have to induce market participants to change their 
behaviour in such a way as to produce an outcome that 
meets the ultimate objectives/ goals of energy policy 
subject to a range of economic, political and legislative 
constraints. Typically, progress would be assessed at least 
partially through monitoring of intermediate targets or 
indicators. Implicit in this policy framework is a judgement 
that, in the absence of energy policies, liberalised markets 
would produce outcomes that were incompatible with the 
objectives of policy makers. These objectives include lower 
emissions, so as to inhibit climate change, and improved 
security of supply. 
 
The fact that, as far as energy issues are concerned, 
Scotland is part of a multilevel governance structure that 
incorporates world-wide, EU, UK and Scottish-specific 
institutions, inevitably complicates our analysis. The theory 
of fiscal federalism deals with the issue of the “appropriate” 
allocation of fiscal powers across different levels of 
government, and we draw on this to inform our discussion 
of how the Scottish Government might most efficiently 
contribute to the overall goals of Scottish energy policy. 
 
In Section 2 we identify the goals of Scottish energy policy, 
compare them to those of the UK to reveal the similarities 
and differences and consider the issue of the geographic 
scale to which each goal most naturally relates. In Section 
3 we discuss the targets of Scottish energy, and again the 
spatial scale to which they relate. We analyse the 
instruments of Scottish policy in Section 4, and there 
consider the fiscal federalism issues that relate to the 
appropriate spatial allocation of these instruments. We 
consider constraints in Section 5, including the possible 
existence of trade-offs among the goals of energy policy 
and also between these and the wider objectives of the 
Scottish Government and briefly consider how these may 
be resolved. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
 
2.  The Goals of Scottish Energy Policy 
In a statement to the Scottish Parliament on 31 May 2007 
the Energy Minister, Jim Mather, explicitly identified the 
goals or overarching objectives of Scottish energy policy. 
As far as we are aware this is the first time such goals have 
been so clearly and publicly articulated (although it is 
apparent that previous Scottish administrations shared very 
similar objectives, e.g. Scottish Executive, 2006). They 
cover four main issues. These are: 
 
 Reduce carbon emissions, and so tackle climate 
change (environment) 
 
 Need to ensure security of energy supplies by 
fostering a vibrant, diverse and competitive energy 
sector that is rooted here in Scotland (security of 
supply) 
 
 Need to deliver energy at an affordable price for 
both individuals and businesses (price) 
 
 Ensuring that energy policy allows the energy sector 
to continue to make its vital contribution to economic 
growth (growth) 
 
These are very similar to the goals stated in the UK White 
Paper, which also emphasises environment, security and 
price. However, there does seem to be a difference in 
emphasis, reflected in the phrases in italics above. This is 
most notable in respect of the role of (renewable) energy in 
growth, which is never mentioned as a goal of UK energy 
policy. The similar emphasis in the context of the security 
of supply objective is again distinctive (an issue we return 
to below). 
 
Before proceeding further with our analysis, it is worth 
commenting on the fact that these policy goals relate to 
rather different spatial scales. This suggests that the most 
appropriate level for determining and co-ordinating policy 
action will vary among them. This has implications for the 
nature of the optimal role that the Scottish Government can 
play in achieving each of these goals. 
 
The spatial scale of energy policy goals and 
the role of the Scottish Government 
We consider the spatial scale associated with each of the 
Scottish Government’s goals in turn, starting with the 
environmental objective. 
 
Environment 
 
Naturally, both the Scottish and UK governments recognize 
that climate change is fundamentally a global problem that 
would appear to require global solutions. Scottish, and 
indeed UK, contributions to the problem are simply 
insignificant in relation to the scale of the overall problem
1
. 
This would suggest that the UK and Scottish governments 
should be doing all that they can do to support global 
solutions. In principle, these solutions could be either fixed-
quantity or price-based
2
. Whilst there are instances of 
energy taxes (including the Climate Change Levy (CCL) in 
the UK), in practice attempted global solutions have tended 
to be quantity based, such as Kyoto and the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
3
.  
 
Both the Scottish and UK governments claim to be 
supporting global initiatives and helping to make them 
work. This is evidenced, for example, by their support for 
Kyoto, and their commitment to meeting the emissions 
targets that are implied, with Scotland agreeing to 
contribute its “fair” share to these targets. Although 
solutions may have to be agreed at the global level, they 
are implemented and delivered at the “local” level. This 
clearly leaves a role for UK and Scottish governments, at 
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the very least in terms of complementing world policies and 
encouraging public and private sector compliance and 
reinforcement. Indeed Stern (2006) argues that local 
knowledge is the key to the efficient implementation of 
climate change policy, and governments have a significant 
role to play in the provision of appropriate local public 
goods (for example, public transport systems). In particular, 
governments should pursue policies that avoid “locking in” 
established, carbon-intensive technologies. However, 
equally there is need for a coordinated approach, to ensure 
an efficient response to global policies. 
 
The Stern Report (2006) emphasizes the importance of 
establishing an international, credible price of carbon so as 
to internalize the world-wide externality of climate change. 
Clearly, this cannot be done by either the UK or Scotland in 
isolation. Ideally, if the trading option is pursued, the price 
of carbon would be established in an integrated world 
market for carbon. The world carbon trading scheme would 
then ensure that, for any given level of the carbon cap, the 
targeted reduction in emissions would be achieved at least 
cost. In fact, at present, such an integrated world carbon 
market does not exist. However, an EU market has now 
been established through its ETS, and the UK (and by 
implication Scotland) is a member. This is inevitably 
associated with inefficiencies relative to a world scheme, 
since, for example, the EU may bear significant costs 
relative to the “free riders” who are not covered by its own, 
or some comparable, trading scheme. Again, at first sight, 
at least, the role of the UK and Scottish governments 
should be a supportive one, reinforcing the EU ETS and 
assisting its efficient operation.  
 
Of course, the establishment of a credible carbon price 
would automatically improve the economics of non-carbon-
intensive technologies and encourage their deployment 
and operation. In the key area of electricity generation, for 
example, this would favour the development of nuclear, as 
well as renewable, technologies. The low carbon intensity 
of nuclear is, of course, a crucial factor that is finding much 
greater favour with the UK government. But nuclear 
technology remains controversial and the Scottish 
government has said it wishes to phase out nuclear, which 
we consider further below (e.g Scottish Government, 
2007). For now we simply note that a “no nuclear” policy 
makes any given carbon emissions target more difficult to 
achieve. 
 
Clearly the adoption of UK- and Scottish-specific emissions 
targets is intended to be an expression of strong support 
for the wider international initiatives, but we consider 
whether this is in fact the case in our subsequent 
discussion of policy targets. 
 
Security of supply  
 
Watson and Scott (2008) identify four dimensions of 
“energy security”: lack of domestic infrastructure; 
technology or infrastructure failure; domestic activism or 
terrorism; fossil fuel scarcity and external disruptions 
(including international terrorism).  We briefly consider each 
in turn. 
 
Perhaps the most basic aspect of energy security, in the 
context of electricity, relates to the fact that electricity is 
essentially not storable. Demand and supply therefore 
have to match instantaneously, and insurance against 
power cuts necessitates the presence of excess capacity in 
the system, as well as an effective transmission and 
distribution system. The objective is to ensure that 
blackouts of the kind attributable to the simultaneous loss 
of output at Sizewell B and Longannet (in May 2008) 
remain very rare events. Unbridled (spot) market forces 
could perhaps in principle ensure that demands and 
supplies are matched, but in high demand conditions the 
implication is that some consumers would be priced out of 
the market altogether, and it is not at all clear that any 
government would (or should) be prepared to give a 
credible commitment to such an outcome. Rather, it seems 
likely that there should be some form of government 
intervention, for example, through the incorporation of a 
market for capacity, to ensure the system typically operates 
with excess capacity and can respond to sudden demand 
surges without power cuts or unacceptable distributional 
consequences. On the other hand, there has been 
considerable investment in capacity in the UK in recent 
years, though all of it in combined cycle gas turbines 
(CCGTs), and in the absence of any policy action, this 
would be the market’s likely choice for new capacity 
(Watson and Scott, 2008). 
 
Security of supply was not a major consideration during the 
1980s and 1990s, given that the liberalization and 
privatization of the UK electricity supply industry occurred 
at a time of general excess capacity (Helm, 2005). 
However, the gradual “sweating” of assets has eliminated 
this excess capacity, and there is growing awareness that 
this is again a real issue. With an integrated British 
electricity market, one role for the Scottish Government 
would simply be to encourage the UK government to tackle 
the problem at the level of the UK through encouragement 
of investment in new (presumably non-nuclear) generating 
capacity, and encouragement of modification of large coal 
plants to meet the European Large Coal Plant Directive 
(LCPD). 
 
We consider whether the ambitious Scottish policies for 
increasing renewable generating capacity, with the 
expectation of increasing the diversity of the electricity 
generating portfolio, serves to mitigate security of supply 
concerns in our subsequent discussion of energy targets. 
 
Technology failures have, on occasion, been dramatic (as 
in the case of Chernobyl), but there are many lesser 
examples of failures in parts of the energy system 
infrastructure, in part due to the impact of extreme weather 
conditions that may themselves be attributable to global 
warming (Watson and Scott, 2008).  Effective action on the 
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environment may therefore in itself contribute to security of 
supply in this sense. 
 
A further dimension of security of supply, and one that has 
received most emphasis recently, relates to the importance 
of imported energy and external threats. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that imports will be “less secure” than 
indigenous supply, in that indigenous supply could be 
threatened by industrial action (a major concern when 
generation was dominated by coal), and by protest action 
by road hauliers. Furthermore, indigenous provision could 
be subject to terrorist threat. If fuel, or electricity itself, is 
imported from a reliable source, there is no reason why this 
should be problematic. The concentrated distribution of oil 
(Middle East) and gas (Russia) resources gives rise to 
political concerns, but a diversified portfolio of generation 
sources and perhaps a portfolio of reliable sources of 
imports, together with an adequate infrastructure to guard 
against a range of risks, would seem appropriate. 
However, there is the threat of price shocks to both oil and 
gas, and so renewable technologies, and nuclear, provide 
some hedge against these risks.  
 
Sharp rises in oil prices have had serious macroeconomic 
consequences in the past, generating stagflation, a 
simultaneous adverse shock to inflation and output and 
employment. The reduced oil-intensity of Scottish (and UK) 
production and the current conduct of monetary policy, with 
an independent Bank of England targeting inflation, serves 
to reduce the “shock” potential of the oil price, but recent 
experience reminds us that it does not eliminate it. 
Managing macroeconomic policies in circumstance less 
favourable than the recent “nice” (non-inflationary 
continuous expansion) decade has become more 
challenging.
4
 Current debates concerning the impact of oil 
price rises on total tax revenues, depend critically on 
whether the system-wide consequences for other tax 
revenues partially, or even more than wholly, offset the 
undoubted stimulus to taxes on fuels that recent oil price 
rises generate. 
 
A limiting form of the “external threat” view of security of 
supply suggests that Scotland should seek to be self-
sufficient in energy in general, and in electricity in 
particular. While energy/ electricity is undoubtedly an 
important good, in a liberalised system the “trade balance” 
on this is entirely determined by market forces. Scotland is 
a small, open regional economy and under present policies 
e.g. electricity (or inputs to generate it) is traded in 
increasingly integrated European and world energy 
markets. The precise electricity trade balance, for example, 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK is the outcome of 
a complex combination of supply and demand-side 
decisions taken by households and firms in the context of 
liberalised markets. Currently, Scotland is a significant net 
exporter of electricity but this simply reflects the current 
balance of markets forces in the Great Britain electricity 
system combined with the geographic distribution of 
generating sources and electricity consumers. 
Trying to impose an essentially arbitrary self-sufficiency 
constraint might prove disastrous economically (even if it 
could be achieved) and it simply may not make any 
economic sense to attempt to impose self-sufficiency. 
Finally, it is not clear that the Scottish Government has the 
instruments available to ensure it, even if it wished to. And 
why it would wish to is not clear since self-sufficiency is, as 
our earlier discussion clarified, not at all the same thing as 
security of supply. 
 
Security of supply issues can be tackled through increased 
diversity of both domestic generating capacity (in excess 
supply), and in sources for imported fuels (and associated 
infrastructure including gas storage facilities). However, 
this is likely to be costly and subject to substantial 
economies of scale, so that many aspects of security of 
supply would be best dealt with internationally, perhaps at 
the level of the EU. While the integrated European 
electricity market remains an aspiration for now, it seems 
likely to be very inefficient for each of the individual nations 
and regions of the UK to attempt to make separate 
provision for their own security of supply, since there 
already exits an integrated electricity market. At the very 
least a coordinated UK-wide approach seems essential.  
 
Against these considerations the wording of the Scottish 
Government’s security of supply goal perhaps seems 
restrictive in focusing exclusively on the nature of the 
energy sector within Scotland. However, a generous 
interpretation would view this as implying a contribution to 
security of supply within the UK as a whole, given the 
presence of integrated energy markets, and in previous 
documents Scottish administrations have, for example, 
pressed for increased interconnector capacity (with EU and 
the UK), and for a review of the transmission charging 
regime with a view to ensuring adequate incentives to 
maintain surplus generating capacity in Scotland, as part of 
a broader approach to security of supply (e.g. Scottish 
Executive, 2006).
5
 We consider the role of renewables 
targets in this context subsequently.  
  
Price 
 
At first sight, the affordable price objective would appear to 
be problematic for both UK and Scottish governments, 
assuming “affordable” is intended to convey something 
different (and potentially lower) than “market determined”. 
Further, the impression is that the UK government has 
tended perhaps, to de-emphasise it in the recent past and 
to express it in less ambitious language
6
. Since 
liberalization and privatization occurred against the 
background of excess capacity, these policies did 
ultimately deliver lower prices, though these were reversed 
as capacity issues began to emerge and the oil price rises 
of the 2000s began. The latter fact also serves to remind 
us that the price of some key energy inputs, notably oil and 
gas, are in any case determined in world markets (although 
influenced by very large suppliers), and these are 
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effectively beyond the control of either the Westminster or 
Holyrood governments.  
 
In our discussion of energy policy instruments below, we 
consider the possibility of influencing this goal through: 
encouragement of variations in North Sea Oil production; 
green taxes; and action to tackle fuel poverty. However, it 
is perhaps worth noting now that while the desire to provide 
affordable prices for individuals and businesses expressed 
in the Scottish Government’s goal, while laudable in terms 
of sentiment, would seem to lie well beyond the abilities of 
the Scottish Government (or for that matter the UK or any 
European government), to deliver in full. Even if it could be 
delivered, it would seem to conflict with the environmental 
objectives of policy, an issue we return to Section 5 below. 
 
Growth  
 
The Scottish Government gives special emphasis to the 
potential role of the energy sector in stimulating economic 
growth (as a goal of its energy policy), in contrast to 
Westminster.
7
 The Scottish government clearly has hopes 
for the renewable energy sector, in particular, to provide a 
stimulus to growth. We argue below that there is economic 
development potential, although for the newer renewable 
and other technologies, not the onshore wind 
developments that currently dominate increments to 
renewable electricity generating capacity. There are risks, 
however, not unlike those traditionally associated with 
government’s attempting to “pick winners”, including rent-
seeking behaviour. However, Stern (2006) certainly 
adopted the view that a wide range of new technologies 
should be encouraged, and perhaps funded internationally, 
so as to avoid potential winners being lost due to the 
development costs that may prove prohibitively large for 
any individual country, and Winskel (2006), argues that the 
Scottish government’s perspective on technology policy is 
distinctive and appropriate. The hope here is that the new 
“banded” ROCs (BERR, 2008), which provide more 
support for the newer renewable technologies, notably 
wave and tidal, will stimulate the deployment of these 
technologies, although some have questioned the 
efficiency of ROCs as against the alternative of a low 
carbon subsidy (that presumably would extend to nuclear 
too). One potential defence is the economic development 
potential of new technologies, but it is difficult to see how 
this could be applied to onshore wind. We return to the 
issue in our discussion of energy policy instruments and 
then again in our discussion of seeking to resolve the 
conflicts between goals below.
8 
 
Helm (2007) has argued that the 2000s heralded a “new 
energy paradigm”. This is characterised in part by a radical 
shift in policy goals towards climate change and in part by 
a move back towards security of supply considerations, 
given the gradual elimination of the excess capacity that 
characterized the 1980s and 90s. Whether or not the 
change is as radical as Helm suggests, there is no 
doubting the importance of both of these objectives in 
current Scottish (as well as UK) Government thinking. 
However, in neither case does the Scottish level of 
government appear to be the most natural one at which to 
seek to address the objective, a comment that seems to 
apply also to the affordable price goal.  As we have 
emphasized, however, this is certainly not an argument for 
“doing nothing”; rather it is an argument for vigorous 
support for policies negotiated, and perhaps coordinated, 
at a higher level of spatial aggregation, namely the UK, EU 
or World levels.   
 
 
3.  Energy policy targets 
The key targets of Scottish and UK energy policy include 
the following: 
 
 A statutory target is proposed for the Scottish 
Climate Change Bill of a fall of 80% in Scottish 
carbon emissions by 2050, whereas in the UK the 
target is at least 60%.
9
 
 
 The target for the percentage of electricity 
generation attributable to renewables in Scotland 
is now 50% by 2020, while the UK aspires to a 
target of 20%. 
 
 The current target for new (and ultimately all) 
nuclear electricity generating capacity is 0%. The 
UK has no target for nuclear, but expects 
substantial new investment in nuclear capacity, 
and aspirations of 20%-30% have been 
mentioned by ministers. (The Prime Minister 
recently confirmed an expectation that new 
nuclear capacity will contribute more than the 
current 19% of UK electricity.)  
 
 While there are no targets for carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) in Scotland or the UK, recent 
interchanges between the Scottish Government 
and Westminster suggest a greater emphasis and 
immediacy in Scotland. 
 
 While there is no target for economic development 
generated by the renewables industry, the 
Scottish Government’s Economic Strategy 
identifies overall growth targets and views the 
energy sector as “key” for growth, while no such 
emphasis is apparent in the UK. 
 
 The Scottish Government has a commitment to 
end fuel poverty by 2016, as far as is reasonably 
practicable (Scottish Government, 2008b, p10). 
(The UK target is eradication by 2018.) 
 
There are clearly substantial differences in energy policy 
targets in Scotland as compared to the UK. Scottish targets 
are typically more ambitious on emissions and renewables 
(and probably CCS), but stipulate (ultimately) no nuclear 
electricity generation at all. The election of the SNP 
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government has cast these differences in sharper relief 
(most notably on nuclear e.g. Scottish Government 
(2007a)), but the differences are certainly not new. 
 
In the goals-targets-instruments-constraints framework that 
we are applying here targets are traditionally regarded as 
mere indicators of progress towards particular goals. In this 
context a key issue is how well the chosen targets relate to 
the ultimate objectives of policy. For example, RSE (2006) 
question the useful of renewables targets as a means of 
achieving lower emissions. But it seems clear that, at least 
for the Scottish Government, renewables targets are in part 
also related to their economic development potential. In a 
world of multiple goals, targets may have more than one 
purpose (though this significantly complicates interpretation 
of movements in targets). 
 
In the energy policy context at least, there is a further 
complication in that it seems that the UK and Scottish 
Governments are not simply using targets as mere 
indicators of progress towards goals. Rather there is a 
suggestion that at least some energy policy targets are 
coming to be regarded almost as instruments of policy, 
believed to be capable of exerting an independent effect, 
presumably through their impact on the expectations of 
private sector transactors. The notion here is analogous to 
an indicative planning process where the government sets 
out its plans clearly, so that the private sector can makes 
its own plans of how most efficiently to react. This is an 
aspect of energy policy targets that we consider in our 
discussion of energy policy instruments below and, for 
now, we abstract from these possible wider impacts of 
targets. 
 
Before proceeding to consider the instruments of energy 
policy, we first reflecting briefly on the rationale and 
consequences of distinctive energy targets for Scotland, 
and, in particular, again consider the appropriate spatial 
scale for action. 
 
Environmental targets 
 
The Scottish and UK governments of course recognise the 
limits of their abilities to impact directly on climate change, 
as we discussed in considering the objectives of energy 
policy. The argument appears to be a moral one, made 
quite explicitly in the case of the Scottish Government, 
about playing a leading role in addressing climate change 
issues and in setting an example in accepting responsibility 
for emissions that other countries might follow (Scottish 
Government, 2007b). Since its target for the overall 
reduction in carbon emissions is even more demanding 
than that set by the UK government, presumably Scotland 
regards itself as setting an even better example. (However, 
this might also, of course, reflect some judgement that 
targets can be achieved here at lower cost, given the 
concentration of renewable sources of energy in Scotland, 
and that this may simultaneously provide growth 
opportunities for Scotland. Both Scotland and the UK are 
intending to commit to a set of binding targets on emissions 
that are self-imposed. This would appear to risk a 
competitiveness loss vis a vis our trading partners to the 
extent that they do not in fact follow our example, although 
there may be indirect gains in terms of signals to 
innovators and new technologies that may be “locked out” 
by the existing inherited energy system.  Given the 
extensive pattern of interregional trade between Scotland 
and the rest-of-the UK, there must be some concern that 
the adverse competitiveness effects of tougher Scottish 
targets may prove problematic. Furthermore, Kyoto has 
been in place for sometime, but leading by example has 
not succeeded in attracting many other voluntary 
participants and there have been a number of significant 
“free riders” who bear none of the direct costs of 
adjustment (Helm, 2005). 
 
The fact that the UK and the Scottish Governments have 
set their own targets for emissions reduction appears to be 
entirely compatible with, and indeed goes well beyond, 
Kyoto, and in this sense they are acting to support world 
action on climate change, no doubt influenced by Stern 
(2006). However, these distinctive targets appear rather 
less supportive when viewed from the perspective of the 
EU ETS. Certainly, if the EU ETS had complete coverage 
and established a credible carbon price, member-specific 
emissions targets would seem to rather miss the point and 
would, if achieved, potentially frustrate the operation of the 
ETS to a degree. The overall EU emissions reductions 
would simply equal the cap and member states’ own goals 
would increase the total costs of meeting the cap without 
any contribution to further emission reduction in the EU as 
a whole (Sorrell and Sijm, 2005). In fairness, the Scottish 
Government (2007b) has recognized the tension here and 
invites views on the scope of the targets, and whether only 
emissions that are not covered by ETS should be included.  
 
Of course, there may still be a rationale for energy policies 
other than ETS. Indeed, at present UK and Scottish 
emissions targets, if achieved, seem likely in fact to 
contribute to overall EU emissions reductions given the 
incomplete coverage of ETS and the absence of a credible 
long-term carbon price. The interaction of individual 
country/ region emissions targets and ETS is something 
that should be closely monitored as the scope of ETS 
expands, and permits begin to be auctioned. 
 
In principle, Carbon Capture and Storage offers immense 
potential in terms of meeting emissions targets, given the 
scale of emissions from large coal plants and EU and UK 
plans to establish demonstration plants are to be 
welcomed. Scotland seems again to be a possible lead 
position given the availability of possible natural storage 
facilities and the expertise available here. 
 
Renewables targets 
 
While the Scottish Government’s target for the percentage 
of electricity produced by renewables has been 
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substantially increased, it has also been pushed well into 
the future. The rationale for renewables targets has been 
questioned, for example, by the RSE (2006). If the sole 
rationale for renewables targets is simply to effect a 
reduction in carbon emissions, the criticism would surely be 
valid. However, it seems clear that these targets reflect a 
judgement about technology policy and the nature of the 
market for electricity. At least a part of their justification 
seems to be to encourage the development and 
deployment of new technologies, which need some non-
market incentive to overcome the “lock-in” effect of existing, 
predominantly large-plant generating technologies. In the 
Scottish context, at least, there is also a belief that the 
development of these new technologies can stimulate 
economic development, a view we consider further below. 
 
The UK and Scottish renewables targets seem to be part of 
both governments’ responses to the security of supply 
issue. Certainly diversity of indigenous generating sources 
would be expected to be an element of any rational policy 
response to perceived security of supply issues. Would the 
targets, if achieved, ensure diversity and improve security 
of supply? One issue here is what precisely is meant by 
diversity. Stirling (2007) identifies three aspects: variety, 
balance and disparity. Variety simply refers to the numbers 
of technologies, balance to the proportions in which 
technologies are held (since one of perhaps many varieties 
could completely dominate supply), and disparity relates to 
the extent to which the technologies differ.  
 
The contribution of the renewables targets to the overall 
Scottish energy portfolio  depends in part on the 
counterfactual: what capacity, if any, is displaced by the 
renewables? If the renewables are simply additional to 
current capacity, then balance may decline, in that portfolio 
shares would be significantly more concentrated than they 
are now, with 50% going to renewables. However, if 
renewables themselves constitutes a range of 
technologies, and not mainly onshore wind, then balance 
may be improved. Again, variety would not necessarily be 
greater if all of the increment to capacity was in wind, but 
would be if wave and tidal and other new renewable 
technologies were stimulated. Disparity would be 
enhanced, since the renewable technologies are quite 
different from the currently dominant technologies of coal, 
nuclear and gas.  
 
Of course, if renewables replace nuclear capacity, other 
things being equal, diversity in Scotland may not increase 
in all dimensions, and indeed could actually decrease. 
However, a diversified portfolio of renewables would be 
likely to improve all dimensions of diversity. Notice that if 
increases in diversity are dependent on the diversity of 
renewables themselves, the current aggregate target will 
do nothing to ensure it, (although the banded ROCs, which 
we discuss below, should help in this regard). However, in 
these circumstances diversity would have little to do with 
the 50% target per se. 
 
Overall, it is not absolutely clear that diversity within 
Scotland would increase if renewables targets are 
achieved, because it depends on precisely how they are 
met, and on which technologies they replace. So, at least 
in this respect, security of supply within Scotland is not 
inevitably improved if renewables targets are met, though it 
seems likely that it would be enhanced, and it almost 
certainly would be if nuclear were retained too.  
 
Of course, we have earlier argued that Scotland is not 
necessarily the natural level of government at which to 
consider security of supply issues, especially in the 
presence of an integrated British market for electricity. 
From a UK perspective, major development of renewable 
energy sources in Scotland make achievement of UK 
renewables targets easier, and would almost certainly 
improve every dimension of diversity within the UK, since 
nuclear is to be retained in the rest of the UK. This 
argument would hold with even greater force for the EU as 
a whole, in circumstances where an integrated EU market 
in electricity is established. 
 
Nuclear 
 
Nuclear presently accounts for around 26.4% of electricity 
generated in (compared with 18.9% in the UK as a whole) 
in 2006 (BERR, 2007). Clearly then any decommissioning 
of nuclear therefore has a major impact on Scotland’s total 
generating capacity, and it seems this has to be replaced 
by renewables generation. One problem here is that the 
output of renewables is not a perfect substitute for that of 
nuclear. The latter’s invariance and constancy of supply is 
especially well-suited to providing baseload, whereas the 
intermittency of renewables output imposes additional 
costs on the system, that may be expected to vary directly 
with the share of renewables in total generation (Gross et 
al, 2006). The UK government’s change of mind on 
building new nuclear capacity is based upon its low carbon 
content, and ability to deliver baseload, and its potential 
contribution to security of supply (though this has been 
challenged by Watson and Scott (2008)). The Scottish 
Government’s position, of course, necessitates the 
development of alternative generating capacity (or less net 
exports of electricity). 
 
The Scottish Government’s intention to eliminate fuel 
poverty by 2014, is the only target that appears to relate 
directly to the affordable price goal. However, the 
significant qualification, that the commitment applies as far 
as is reasonably practicable, does raise the question of the 
strength of the commitment. Indeed, more generally, a key 
issue is whether the Scottish (and UK) Government’s 
targets are little more than aspirations.  What matters is 
whether the targets are credible, and that depends, to a 
significant degree, on whether the Scottish Government 
has the policy instruments with which to achieve these 
targets, and the willingness to apply them appropriately.  
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4.  Energy policy instruments 
We identify the energy-policy related powers that devolved 
to the Scottish Parliament and those that are reserved to 
Westminster in Box 1. Note that reserved powers include 
the conduct of macroeconomic policy and the tax-transfer 
system. Although these are not specifically energy policies, 
they do have a potentially major impact on energy issues. 
Thus the conduct of macroeconomic policy in the face of oil 
price shocks may be critical: indeed it has been asserted 
that the oil price has lost its ability to shock altogether, 
given the implementation of the new monetary and fiscal 
rules, although recent experience suggests this is overly 
optimistic, especially as far as really major oil price rises 
are concerned. In terms of direct influence over the energy 
industry (oil, gas, coal, electricity), it is important to 
recognise that the main factors that influence this (e.g. 
regulation, taxation) are governed by Westminster. The UK 
Government has the power, for example, to alter the entire 
regulatory framework, an option that is clearly not open to 
the Scottish Government. In principle, the UK Government 
could change the way that the energy industry is 
structured, owned and governed, so that there is 
considerable asymmetry in the powers of Westminster and 
Holyrood in this context. 
 
In Box 2, we summarise the main instruments of EU, UK 
and Scottish energy policies. The UK Government’s control 
of the tax system, and in particular its ability to set and 
adjust “green” taxes levied on energy- or carbon-intensive 
inputs or outputs, is potentially the most powerful economic 
instrument of all, whereas the Scottish Parliament currently 
has no power to vary taxes (other than the “tartan tax” 
power that allows up to a 3p in the £ variation in the 
standard rate of income tax). Green taxes include the fuel 
price escalator that seeks to progressively increase fuel 
prices in order to induce a trend decline in fuel use and a 
reduction in carbon emissions. Furthermore, control of the 
tax-transfer system enables the UK Government to 
influence fuel poverty directly through transfers to affected 
households. (Winter fuel payments, however, are based 
simply on age, not the proportion of households’ income 
that is devoted to fuel.) The predominant influence of the 
UK (and EU) is also apparent through responsibilities for 
regulatory powers, which lie very predominantly outwith the 
powers of the Scottish Government, though this, of course, 
does not mean that they completely outwith their influence. 
 
The links between instruments, targets and goals 
 
At least in the conventional goals-targets-instruments-
constraints framework we would expect policy instruments 
to be more directly linked to targets than to the ultimate 
goals of policy. Indeed, typically instruments of policy 
would be expected to impact on the goals of policy through 
a transmission mechanism that operates via targets. 
Accordingly, here we relate policy instruments primarily to 
the targets of policy. 
 
Before proceeding, however, it may be worth recalling that 
the relationship between targets and goals may not be that 
straightforward, and both UK and Scottish Governments 
seem to share an expectation that achievement of any 
given target may contribute to the attainment of more than 
one goal. Clearly emissions targets link most directly to the 
environmental objective, but they may also contribute to 
security of supply by reducing the risks of energy system 
failures due to climate-change-induced extreme weather 
conditions. Renewables targets may be seen as 
contributing to the environmental objectives (at least if they 
replace carbon intensive generating capacity, though less 
clear if they replace nuclear), but there may also be a belief 
that they contribute to security of supply through diversity 
and encourage growth by encouraging new renewable 
energy industries. The positive nuclear target of the UK 
Government is regarded as contributing to environmental 
and security of supply goals. The negative judgement 
about the environmental (though not emissions-related) 
impact of nuclear leads the Scottish Government to believe 
that its zero nuclear target contributes to its overall 
environmental objective (though not its emissions target) 
(Scottish Government, 2007a). 
 
Notice, however, that while most of the goals of policy have 
targets that can be linked positively to them (although there 
may be doubts about the strength of the linkages), only fuel 
poverty seems to link at all to the affordable price of energy 
goal. Accordingly, we give separate consideration to the 
links between energy policy instruments and this policy 
objective. 
 
Policy instruments and the emissions targets 
 
The fact that both Scotland and the UK are proposing 
committing themselves to statutory targets for emissions is 
surely significant. The motivation is to emphasise the 
seriousness of the environmental goal, to establish 
credibility of the emissions targets and provide the 
appropriate framework for transactors, in both private and 
public sectors, to make decisions informed by the 
Governments’ plans. The analogy is with the independence 
of the Bank of England and it being tasked to set interest 
rates to seek to ensure that inflation remains within its 
target range. The Bank of England’s case is regarded as 
very successful, and the evidence clearly supports this for 
the “nice” decade, though circumstances are now more 
challenging. A key element in the success of the new 
monetary regime has been its ability to lower transactors’ 
inflation expectations, and so reduce adjustment costs. 
 
In the climate change context the hope is presumably that 
transactors similarly base their expectations of emissions 
on published, legally-binding targets believing that policy 
will be adjusted to ensure that these are met. Since the 
targets stretch out to 2050 they potentially provide a very
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Box 1:   Energy Powers Reserved to Westminster and 
Energy Powers Devolved to Scotland 
 
Reserved matters 
 (Macroeconomic policy; tax-transfer 
system) 
 Generation, transmission, distribution 
and supply of electricity 
 Most aspects of the ownership, 
exploration and exploitation of oil and 
gas, including pipelines, and 
restrictions on other activities 
offshore 
 Coal ownership, deep and opencast mining 
and subsidence from mining 
 Nuclear energy and nuclear installations 
including safety, security and liability 
for nuclear occurrences 
 Energy conservation by prohibition or 
regulation 
 
Devolved matters 
 Environmental protection and pollution, 
specifically discharges, air pollution 
and integrated pollution control, under 
the provisions of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 in relation to oil 
and gas, coal, nuclear 
 Planning approval of the development of 
energy infrastructure other than 
pipelines and transmission lines under 
the various Town and Country Planning 
(Scotland) Acts 
 Permissions for the manufacture of gas 
and non pipeline conveyance of gas 
 Restoration of land affected by coal 
mining 
 Emergency planning and civil nuclear 
power stations 
 Environmental regulation 
 Encouragement of energy efficiency 
 Promotion of renewable energy and powers 
in relation to climate change 
 Consents for power stations and overhead 
electricity lines 
 Approvals for land based gas pipelines 
 
Source: based on Royal Society of Edinburgh 
(2006), quoting Scotland Act 1998 Schedule 5, 
and Winskell (2006) 
 
 
Box 2: EU, UK and Scottish Energy Policy 
Instruments 
 
Main EU-wide instruments 
 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) 
This is an EU-wide programme targeting carbon 
dioxide emissions where emitters must provide 
permits to cover all emissions. This operates 
through the “cap and trade” principle, and for 
the energy sectors, covers all combustion 
installations with a rated thermal output of 
greater that 20MW, mineral oil refineries and 
coke ovens. As such, the EU ETS “currently 
regulates just under 50% of Scottish CO2 
emissions” (Scottish Government, 2008). 
European Commission proposed in January 2008 
(the its Energy Policy for Europe) that the EU 
ETS be expanded to other emissions, including 
transport and domestic gas supplies, and that 
the EU ETS be revised to cover almost all 
industrial installations and, from 2012, 
aviation. 
 Large Combustion Plant Directive 
This requires member states to reduce pollution 
of a number of (non-CO2) pollutants from 
industrial (fuel-burning) processes. New 
electricity generation facilities must meet 
stated emission limit values, which the UK has 
a National Emissions Reduction Plan for 
existing electricity generation facilities and 
from January 2008 facilities can trade (within 
the UK) their allowances for emissions of 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and 
particulates with other plants in the scheme. 
 EU Directive on the Energy Performance 
of Buildings 
This directive sets out the measuring and 
reporting of the energy performance of new and 
existing buildings, with member countries 
responsible for setting the minimum standards. 
 
Main UK-wide instruments 
 Green taxes 
Air passenger duty, fuel duties, (the revised) 
vehicle excise duty are all examples of UK tax 
system being used to tax activities seen as 
causing environmental damage. A further example 
is the Climate Change Levy (see below). 
 UK tax-transfer system 
The primary route through which centrally-
collected tax revenues are redistributed to 
individuals and corporations. 
 Winter fuel payments 
Annual payments to most people over age 60, 
with additional payments of £50 to households 
with someone aged between 60 and 79, and £100 
to someone aged over 80. 
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 Proposed legally-binding emissions 
targets? 
UK Climate Change Bill proposes binding 
emissions targets of 60% reduction in CO2 
emissions by 2050, and Committee on Climate 
Change set up to advise on whether this target 
should be increased. 
 Renewable Obligation 
The RO compels electricity supply companies to 
provide Renewables Obligation Certificates 
(ROCs) – gained by accredited renewable 
generators for each MWh of electricity produced 
– corresponding to a growing share of the 
electricity they supply, or to pay a buyout 
price for the amount they are short of the 
necessary share (6.7% in 2006-7), and growing 
to 15.4% by 2015 and remaining constant to 
2027.  
 Climate Change Levy 
From April 2001, this is a tax on the use of 
energy in industry, commerce and the public 
sector, with “revenue-neutral” cuts in 
employers’ National Insurance contributions. In 
current form the CCL was originally estimated 
to raise £1 billion annually, with 0.3% 
reduction in rate of NI contributions. 
Initially also provides funding for the work of 
the Carbon Trust. 
 Climate Change Agreements 
Industrial sectors liable to pay the CCL could 
negotiate discounts in rates of levy payable 
alongside agreement to meet targets for energy 
efficiency at sectoral level. 
 Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
(replacing the Energy Efficiency 
Commitment) 
Beginning in 1
st
 April 2008 and running for 
three years, this is an obligation on energy 
suppliers to achieve targets in promoting 
reductions in carbon emissions in the household 
sector. This is described by DEFRA as “the 
principal driver of energy efficiency 
improvements in existing homes in Great 
Britain”. 
 Carbon Reduction Commitment (starting 
2010) 
This will encourage energy efficiency in large 
business and public sector organisations 
(responsible for 10% of UK emissions), through 
trading of permits for energy use emissions and 
electricity use (indirect emissions), where 
these are outside either the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme or Climate Change Agreements. 
 Carbon Trust 
Set up in 2001 with revenues from the Climate 
Change Levy, this provides support for business 
energy efficiency programmes and the 
development of low carbon technologies. 
 Energy Saving Trust 
Responsible for the promotion of cleaner fuels 
for transport, energy efficiency for buildings 
and homes, and small scale renewable energy 
projects. There is a Scottish office, funded by 
the Scottish Government providing assistance 
through the Scottish Community and Householder 
Renewables Initiative. 
 UK Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation 
This is designed to work in a similar way to 
the Renewable Obligation, requiring suppliers 
of fuel to ensure that a percentage of their 
aggregate sales is met from biofuels. This 
began at 2.5% and will rise to 5% by 2010. 
 
Main Scottish-specific instruments 
 Proposed legally-binding emissions 
targets? 
Scottish Climate Change Bill proposes target of 
80% reduction Scottish CO2 emissions from 1990 
base year, with annual carbon budgets and 
system of monitoring and reporting. 
 Marine Supply Obligations 
From 1
st
 of April 2007, the MSO requires 
suppliers with an obligation under the 
Renewables Obligation (Scotland) Order (ROS) to 
meet a portion of their obligation through 
providing ROCs earned by Scottish-based wave or 
tidal generation, or pay a higher buyout price. 
Suppliers will be required to comply with the 
MSO when the requirements rises above zero, as 
accredited wave and tidal generators become 
operational in Scottish waters. 
 Scottish Ministers’ Wave and Tidal 
Energy Scheme 
Total budget of £8 million to provides grants 
to businesses to support the installation and 
deployment of wave and tidal devices and 
testing of components at the European Marine 
Energy Centre in Orkney. 
 The Saltire Prize 
Announced in April 2008, this is a £10 million 
“challenge prize” for advances in clean energy, 
focusing on those which can be demonstrated in 
Scotland and which would take advantage of 
Scotland’s renewable energy resources. 
 Warm Deal 
Provides grants of up to £500 for householders 
aged over 60 to have domestic insulation 
installed. Smaller grants available for 
households not in receipt of certain income-
related benefits. 
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 Scottish Community and Households 
Renewables Initiative 
With funding of £18million since its inception, 
the Scottish Government supports the 
development of small scale renewables 
principally through this mechanism. Managed by 
the Energy Savings Trust and Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise, this offers grants, support 
and advice to community and households 
interested in developing and installing 
renewable energy technologies. 
 Loan Action Scotland 
The Scottish Government has provided funding of 
£3 million to be made available to SMEs through 
a “revolving” loan fund for capital investments 
in energy efficiency improvements for projects 
between £5000 and £100,000 at 0% fixed interest 
rate. 
 Central Energy Efficiency Fund 
The Scottish Government has allocated funding 
of £24 million to provide loan funding for 
capital investments in energy efficiency 
improvements across the public sector in 
Scotland. 
 Energy and the Building Regulation 
System 
Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004  and 
revised Building Regulations introduced in 2006 
 Planning regulations – Scottish Planning 
Policy 6 
This, announced in March 2007, set out changes 
to the Scottish planning system to the process 
by which renewable energy proposals are 
prepared and permission determined, 
specifically to “ensure the delivery of 
renewable energy targets as well as supporting 
the development of a viable renewables industry 
in Scotland”. 
 
Sources: UK Climate Change Programme 2006, 
Scottish Government Consultation on Proposals 
for a Climate Change Bill, Renewables 
Obligation Annual Report 2006-7, various 
Scottish and UK Government websites. 
 
 
 
 long-term framework, which could, for example, have a 
significant impact on the expectations of those individuals and 
firms who are considering investments in low carbon 
technologies. If the policy announcement is indeed credible and 
widely believed, then there should be some independent 
stimulus to emissions reduction from this source. So here the 
legal framework in which “targets” are introduced becomes, in 
effect, an additional policy instrument. However, it would be 
fortuitous to an incredible degree if the mere setting of legally 
binding targets changed behaviour to such an extent as to 
make the targets self-fulfilling. Accordingly, policy instruments 
directed at emissions reductions remain essential. 
 
Credibility is critical here, as is apparent from the very recent 
signs of divergence of market inflation expectations from the 
targeted inflation range. As this example shows, credibility 
cannot be taken for granted, and a key determinant of this will 
be market confidence that the government will use policy 
instruments to ensure satisfaction of the emissions targets. Of 
course, the fact that the targets are to be legally binding helps a 
great deal in establishing credibility. But the analogy with the 
inflation case seems imperfect, since there we are dealing with 
adjustment of a single policy instrument, with reasonably well-
known linkages to the single goal. There does not appear to be 
a comparable instrument with a known transmission 
mechanism to emissions reduction.   
 
The EU ETS is, of course, targeted at emissions, but for the EU 
as a whole, not the UK or Scotland and, as we have noted, 
targeting the distribution of emissions within the EU may 
frustrate the supposed advantages of a trading scheme. Green 
taxes, here including the climate change levy (and associated 
policies), have a potentially major role to play, although the 
hauliers protests remind us of the apparent political limits, 
though these may themselves be influenced by educational 
policies. All of the other policies intended to encourage lower 
carbon intensive energy service provision are also helpful here, 
though none is ideal since none (other than ETS) is directed 
specifically at carbon content. The UK’s nuclear policy helps 
with emissions, whereas the Scottish Government’s does not 
(although they would argue a net environmental gain from 
phasing out nuclear). Finally, economic activity may change to 
achieve target emissions, though given these are in general 
positively related, a tradeoff exists, which we consider further 
below. Targeting fiscal policy to carbon emission might improve 
credibility, but the macroeconomic costs may be great. 
 
There are, therefore, many policy instruments that can impact 
on carbon emissions, but the apparent simplicity of the target 
inflation analogy does not hold, and the possible need for a 
carbon tax in the absence of a truly comprehensive and 
effective EU ETS is something that ought to be considered. 
 
 
Policy instruments and the renewables targets 
 
Presumably the UK, and especially the Scottish, Government 
would hope that renewables targets would similarly provide a 
framework in which transactors can take better informed 
decisions, secure in the knowledge of the government’s long-
term commitment to renewables. This provides a context in 
which private investors are more likely to engage in risky 
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renewable investments. While there must be something in this, 
the fact that these targets on renewables are not statutory 
suggests that any such impact here is likely to be lower than in 
the emissions case. Changes in targets, and extension of the 
time frame, in a non-binding framework, may reduce credibility. 
Certainly, it is even more important in this case that the private 
sector be convinced that the targets are meaningful and that is 
likely to depend, to some extent, on a belief that the policy 
authorities have the relevant policy instruments and are 
prepared to use them to the full extent. 
 
Of course, the main policy instrument at present in this context 
is the Renewable Obligation (RO). Winskel (2006) traces the 
development of renewables policy in both Scotland and the UK. 
It is quite clear that the RO has significantly stimulated 
renewables capacity. However, because it is “technology blind”, 
it has had the biggest impact on the renewables technology that 
was closest to commercialisation, namely onshore wind. After 
some debate, the decision was taken to support the introduction 
of “banded ROCs”, as the Scottish Government had wished 
(but DTI had initially opposed), so as to improve the incentives 
to develop marine technologies. Resistance to reforming the 
RO had been based on the kind of considerations that attend 
attempts to “pick winners”. However, the judgement that 
encouraging the development and deployment of promising 
newer technologies required incentives to overcome initial cost 
barriers and inertia eventually proved persuasive.  
 
Additionally, the Scottish Government has sought to stimulate 
renewables by influencing UK government policies. For 
example, the current structure of grid charges could inhibit the 
development of renewables given resource concentration in 
perhipheral areas located far from the major sources of 
demand, and there are signs of some initial success here at 
least in stimulating a review
10
. There has also been an attempt 
to modify Ofgem’s behaviour, and perhaps alter its seemingly 
predominant “least cost” objective, to reflect some of the wider 
goals of energy policy. 
 
Policy instruments and the nuclear target 
 
While nuclear power is a reserved matter, under devolved 
powers any application to build a new nuclear power station in 
Scotland would require consent from Scottish Ministers under 
Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989. While any application 
would need to be considered on its individual merits, the 
Scottish Government has made its desire to phase out nuclear 
very clear. The non-nuclear target therefore may be the easiest 
for the Scottish Government to achieve. 
 
The UK policy position is less clear. Some form of intervention 
would seem to be required to encourage the scale of private 
sector investment in new nuclear that would be required for the 
UK to achieve its (as yet implicit) targets. It is not clear what 
form this is likely to take. 
 
Policy instruments and price affordability 
 
There are a number of possible policy influences on price 
affordability, including North Sea Oil production; tax policy and 
instruments aimed at fuel poverty. However, given that North 
Sea Oil production is small in relation to world oil production, 
variations in its production would be expected to have a 
negligible impact on world oil prices (though of course they 
would have a proportionately bigger impact on UK Treasury 
revenues).   
 
The UK government has more options at its disposal than its 
Scottish counterpart, given its ability, at least in principle, to set 
green taxes and adjust their levels depending on 
circumstances. The September 2000 protests over the fuel 
price escalator served to remind us that the government’s green 
fiscal powers are subject to the constraint of public willingness 
or acceptance of such changes, as do the (so far) less dramatic 
haulier protests and veiled threats of May 2008. However, the 
UK government can, for example, suspend the fuel price 
escalator, and could, conceivably, adjust fuel taxes generally 
partially to mitigate the impact of rising fuel prices (as current 
protests are suggesting), although such changes would clearly 
act against climate change objectives. (See the discussion of 
the trade off between goals below.)  Since the Scottish 
government currently has no control over taxation (other than 
the “tartan tax”), it can have no such influence over net of tax 
fuel prices, except to the extent of its ability to influence 
Westminster decisions. However, the fiscal powers of the UK 
Government are unable ultimately to offset upward pressure on 
world energy prices. 
 
To the extent that increased fuel prices are being driven by 
demand side factors, however, environmental concerns would 
strongly suggest that no attempt should be made to counter 
these changes. Indeed, we are likely ultimately to have to add 
to these prices to build in the impact on emissions, whether 
through a carbon tax or a trading scheme. Furthermore, Stern 
(2006) suggests that such action should be taken sooner rather 
than later. 
 
There have been doubts expressed about just how competitive 
UK, EU and world markets genuinely are. There may be some 
scope for moderating various energy costs through vigorous 
pursuit of competition policy. (Though note there are some 
benefits to the UK of a higher oil price because of North Sea 
Oil.)  
 
Overall, it is not clear how either the UK or Scottish 
governments could be in a position to deliver “affordable” 
energy prices, unless perhaps they have in mind the price of 
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energy delivered to particular target groups, such as the fuel-
poor. Not surprisingly, measured fuel poverty diminished with 
the fall in energy prices of the 1980s and 1990s, but has 
increased with the rise in energy prices of the current decade. It 
is not clear how energy policy per se can tackle this issue: if it is 
a distributional issue, the natural set of instruments are those 
embodied in the tax-transfer system. This would suggest that, 
under current constitutional arrangements, this would become 
primarily a UK responsibility. Of course, there may be Scottish-
specific elements of this problem (e.g. attributable to lower 
average temperatures here), but distributional issues are more 
efficiently tackled by Westminster, and this may be an 
advantage of membership of the UK.  
 
However, the Scottish government can and indeed does assist 
“affordability” more generally through, for example, its Central 
Heating Programme, and re-establishment of the Scottish Fuel 
Poverty Forum.  
 
 
The spatial allocation of energy policy instruments 
 
While Boxes 1 and 2 indicate the current allocation of energy 
policy instruments between the Scottish and UK (and EU) 
Governments, this does not necessarily reflect the most 
efficient allocation. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the 
formal allocation of policy instruments may give a rather 
misleading impression of the ability of the Scottish Parliament to 
conduct a distinctive energy policy. The provision of nuclear 
electricity generating capacity is a striking example of this. 
While in principle a reserved matter, it is now clear that the 
Scottish Government would be very reluctant to approve any 
commercial applications to establish new nuclear capacity. In 
practice, the extent of differentiation in Scottish energy policy is 
perhaps surprising given the formal devolution settlement. 
 
The debate on fiscal federalism and the appropriate degree of 
fiscal autonomy relates to the most efficient allocation of policy 
instruments among the different levels of government in the 
context of a system characterised by multilevel governance. In 
the present context the natural levels relate to the EU, 
Westminster and Scottish Governments. The allocation of 
powers between Westminster and Scotland is broadly 
compatible with fiscal federalism principles, except in respect of 
the very limited devolution of tax powers (McGregor and 
Swales, 2005). The gains to further devolution relate to the 
possible efficiency gains of bring tax and spending powers 
together. However, there are potential efficiency losses, as 
when policies have significant spillover effects to other regions. 
 
For example, suppose green taxes were to be devolved and a 
greener Scottish Government were to raise these relative to the 
rest of the UK. We would expect adverse competitiveness 
effects in Scotland given the extent of interregional trade with 
RUK, though there may be some offsetting gain in terms of the 
stimulus to development and deployment of low carbon 
technologies. These tax changes would inevitably have an 
impact on regional economies furth of Scotland, in this case 
probably positive impacts, at the expense of a loss of activity 
and population from Scotland. Certainly this would sharpen the 
trade off between emissions in Scotland and economic activity 
there. However, there may well be scope for further devolution 
of energy policies from Westminster to Scotland, but if 
efficiency criteria dominate, this should be on a case by case 
basis. 
 
5. Constraints on Scottish energy policy 
Our discussion of goals, targets and instruments has already 
alluded to a number of effective constraints on energy policy. 
Some of these constraints impinge on UK as well as Scottish 
energy policy. World oil prices are outwith Scotland’s and the 
UK’s control, and, notwithstanding short-run apprehension of 
the fallout from the credit crunch, long-term projections continue 
to suggest growing demand, though this of course depends on 
World economic and population growth (with China and India 
exerting major pressure). Forecasts for oil prices are now often 
in the $200 per barrel range, though the detailed demand and 
supply assumptions that underly such forecasts are rarely clear, 
and the extent to which oil and other commodity prices are 
currently under speculative pressure resulting from the credit 
crunch is also unclear. 
 
Furthermore, EU policies clearly impose constraints on the UK 
directly and, less directly, on Scotland. We have already 
discussed the EU ETS though it currently covers only 50% of 
Scottish emissions. Of course, more generally, EU policies 
impose constraints on Scottish energy policy, for example, 
through the EU’s Large Coal Plant Directive (LCPD); buildings 
& energy regulations and binding targets for renewables in the 
UK. UK policies impose constraints through, for example: 
liberalised markets; the regulatory framework and BETTA 
(though here change is feasible through Westminster 
Government action). Of course, the regulatory framework is 
under the control of the Westminster Government. 
 
As explained in the preceding section, the devolution settlement 
reserves many key energy issues to Westminster and this 
imposes further constraints on the conduct of Scottish policy. 
However, we have also seen that despite this there has proved 
to be considerable scope for pursuing a distinctive energy 
policy. For example, planning powers would permit resistance 
in Scotland to any attempt to impose UK policies, such as the 
establishment of new nuclear capacity. Infrastructure issues are 
also key here if the renewable resource is to be usefully 
harnessed, and this could involve offshore grids and cabling 
and upgrading of Beauly-Denny, for example. Ofgem’s 
emphasis on least-cost provision could be interpreted as down 
playing the environmental objective and could militate against 
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the development of renewables. Overall, tighter constraints 
through the devolution settlement inhibit but do not preclude a 
differentiated Scottish policy 
 
While it is not always recognised in policy documents, it seems 
likely that the goals of policy may conflict, so that there may be 
tradeoffs among them. These trade-offs make policy choices 
more painful, but they cannot be ignored in any analysis of 
policy: in effect, they impose additional constraints on the 
conduct of energy policy. 
 
The potential tradeoffs between goals 
 
Tradeoffs among energy policy goals? 
 
There are potential trade-offs between each pair of energy 
policy goals. Improving the environment by reducing emissions 
seems likely to be costly. Correcting the climate change 
externality involves pricing carbon emissions (either through a 
carbon tax or a trading scheme), and so a rise in the cost of 
carbon-intensive processes seems unavoidable.  
 
Improving the environment on the other hand may enhance 
security of supply if it reduces the likelihood of extreme weather 
conditions threatening energy systems. However, while 
environmental issues require a cooperative global solution, 
many security-of-supply concerns appear to arise out of 
suspicion of any cooperative global solutions. In the limit, lack 
of trust would lead to possibly extremely inefficient “self-
sufficiency solutions” to the security of supply problem, though, 
as we have seen, these are not genuine solutions. Achieving 
the environmental goal through larger numbers of onshore wind 
farms is unlikely to enhance economic development through 
energy sector growth. There may well be negative growth 
effects to the extent that this frustrates the development of 
indigenous competitor technologies, such as marine. Again 
there is the potential for conflict, although stimulating wave and 
tidal technologies offers the prospect of complementarity 
between environment and economic development through new 
energy technologies. The real trade-off here is likely to be 
between general economic and population growth and the 
environment, which we consider below. 
 
As we have seen there are many dimensions to security of 
supply, but it does seem very unlikely (though not impossible) 
that improvements in security of supply can be secured without 
pushing up energy prices. Thus the need for diversity would 
appear to preclude simple adoption of the least-cost energy 
source, and so must result in greater energy prices. 
Encouragement of excess capacity in electricity generation 
would seem to require some premium to be paid for unused 
capacity. The affordable price and security of supply objectives 
probably do conflict. Our discussion of renewables targets 
makes it clear that the security of supply and growth objectives 
may not always be aligned. For example, growth in renewables 
may ultimately not add to diversity, although it does seem likely 
to do so for the UK as a whole.  
 
Finally, the goal of growth stimulated by the development of 
indigenous renewables generating capacity appears to conflict 
with the affordable price objective of energy policy. It is in the 
nature of many new technologies that they are initially more 
costly than old technologies, and this is especially so for energy 
systems which tend to have very long-lived assets. The UK 
energy system is dominated by low-cost (if emissions are 
ignored), large-scale production that tends to “lock-in” carbon 
intensive production. New technologies require assistance in 
the early stages if they are to break in to the market, and the 
renewables obligation has been the main instrument for this in 
the UK. Of course, this induces higher electricity prices 
(Bellingham, 2008). 
 
Tradeoffs between energy goals and other policy objectives? 
 
The Scottish Government’s economic strategy emphasises 
sustainable growth of both the economy and population. In 
general, we would expect that the greater the degree of 
success in achieving growth in the Scottish economy and in the 
population of Scotland, the greater greenhouse gas emissions 
would be. This is an example of the trade-off between two 
goals: “success” in one (growth) makes achievement of the 
other – lower emissions – more difficult. 
The trade-off is, however, sensitive to the precise nature of 
growth the sectoral composition of growth and its source 
matter. If, aggregate growth is concentrated in service sectors, 
with lower growth or even decline in energy-intensive 
manufacturing, then emissions can fall even in the presence of 
growth. Also, if growth arises out of renewable energy 
industries being established in Scotland, this would limit 
emissions. 
 
The Scottish Government has made it clear that it sees a moral 
case for Scotland contributing to a global movement to tackle 
climate change, so importing electricity as a means of meeting 
emissions targets would seem to be ruled out (but would a 
reduction in exports be similarly precluded?). In fact, attributing 
responsibility for emissions in an open regional economy is 
difficult, but there are various formal techniques that could allow 
us to make progress in monitoring this.
11
  Of course, different 
sources of energy have different environmental consequences: 
none is completely free of negative impacts on the environment. 
 
Resolving the tradeoff between economic growth and the 
environment  
 
Scotland’s main challenge in the present context is how 
simultaneously to achieve an 80% cut in emissions and higher 
economic and population growth. There are a number of 
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possible candidates, including: energy efficiency improvements; 
development of renewable energy sources; carbon capture and 
storage; combined heat and power; transport policies; 
microgeneration; changing behaviour (Scottish Government, 
2008). 
 
However, resolution of the conflict among goals is often difficult, 
and policies may not always have straightforward 
consequences. Arguments that increases in resource 
(especially energy) efficiency reduce the burden of economic 
activity on environment are now widespread - and influential in 
policy formulation. In a system-wide context, however, this is 
not guaranteed. For example, a 5% increase in energy 
efficiency lowers the price of an effective unit of energy. This 
tends to stimulate demand for energy, measured in efficiency 
units, and the actual reduction in energy use will generally be 
less than 5% (“rebound”) and there might even be an increase 
energy use (“backfire”). Our research suggests these effects 
may be non-trivial (Allan et al, 2007a, and Hanley et al, 2008). 
While this does not imply that energy efficiency improvements 
should not be sought, it does suggest that other energy policies 
may be required to ensure environmental as well as economic 
benefits arise from energy efficiency improvements. 
 
A further example is the use of renewables to stimulate growth 
and benefit the environment. Growth in new renewables has 
mainly occurred through onshore wind, but research suggests 
that this has little “multiplier impact” on Scottish economy (Allan 
et al, 2007b). Onshore windfarms tend not to be extensively 
integrated into the host economy, and with extremely limited 
“backward linkages” through purchases from local suppliers or 
from direct employment. Also, there appears to be little potential 
for supply-side benefits, given largely imported technology. 
However, windfarms can generate important benefits for rural 
communities, though our research suggests that this depends 
critically on the scale of community benefit payments and, 
potentially even more importantly, the share of ownership (Allan 
et al 2008a).  
 
Most recent emphasis on economic development opportunities 
has been on marine (wave and tidal) renewables. Our research 
suggests that there is potential for simultaneous economic 
development opportunities and environmental benefits arising 
from the development of marine renewables. However, this is 
going to depend on policy, on the speed at which learning rates 
with the new technologies reduce unit costs, and the manner of 
the integration of renewables into the existing portfolio of 
electricity generation (Allan et al, 2008b). 
 
While these illustrative analyses are suggestive, much more 
detailed research would be required to assess the feasibility of 
the Scottish Government’s energy objectives and targets, taking 
full account of the implications of eliminating the nuclear base 
load and of the potential for CCS, for example. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The Scottish Government is, and indeed has for some time 
been, pursuing a distinctive energy policy. Further compared to 
UK energy policy this has more ambitious goals and more 
demanding targets (including one of no nuclear electricity 
generation), but is subject to tighter constraints and has fewer 
instruments. Moreover, tradeoffs exist among the price, security 
of supply and environmental objectives of policy, and between 
these and the Scottish Government’s economic and population 
growth targets, which add significantly to the difficulty of 
simultaneously achieving all of the stated goals of policy. On 
the other hand, to the extent that EU and UK policies align with 
the goals of Scottish Energy Policy this facilitates their 
achievement. 
 
In these circumstances would it be better to increase the 
number of energy policy instruments, perhaps through further 
devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament from 
Westminster? Or would it be preferable to adopt fewer targets? 
Or could each be preferred in different circumstances and for 
different policies? 
 
The answers to such questions depend to a significant degree 
on the kind of considerations that are central in theories of fiscal 
federalism. These theories deal with the appropriate allocation 
of powers to different levels of government. So, for example, 
would it be efficient for security of supply to be dealt with at the 
level of individual regions or countries of the UK? Economies of 
scale and scope suggest that the security of supply issue might 
be most efficiently tackled at the level of UK, or perhaps even 
the EU, with trading relationships within the block providing 
security of supply for member countries and regions. However, 
this is once the problem is resolved on behalf of the block as a 
whole. Clearly there are concerns at the UK level about the 
ability of the EU to deliver this anytime soon: but are there real 
concerns for Scotland vis a vis the UK?  
 
A further issue relates to the rationality of each of the individual 
countries and regions of the UK having separate and distinctive 
targets for emissions. Clearly climate change is a global 
concern and UK and Scottish emissions are trivial in relation to 
the scale of the problem. However, the argument here, as the 
Scottish and UK Governments acknowledge, is a moral one of 
setting an example of responsible behaviour. But if there 
genuinely was established a market for carbon that achieved 
the internalization of the climate change externality, this moral 
stance would make little sense, since the geographic 
distribution of emissions under the trading scheme would simply 
reflect the least cost way of correcting the externality. Action to 
alter this distribution would frustrate the fundamental, and 
presumed most efficient, mechanism of the trading scheme. 
This suggests that the UK and Scottish Government’s country-
specific targets should be monitored as the influence of the EU 
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ETS grows through time. Perhaps targets should only relate to 
uncovered emissions, though this raises problems of its own, as 
the proposed Climate Change Bill recognizes. 
 
Naturally, as we have emphasized, even if it was felt that some 
policies should be agreed   at, and coordinated from, a higher 
level of the governance hierarchy, this is not an excuse for 
inaction at lower levels of the multilevel system. Delivery would 
still be critically dependent on local actions, but these might be 
more efficiently organized and coordinated through a higher 
level of government.  
 
Of course, in other areas further devolution of powers to the 
Scottish Government might improve efficiency in the conduct of 
energy policy, as well as economic policy more generally. The 
most obvious area here is tax policy, but the fiscal federalism 
literature, and the available evidence, is not unambiguous in the 
policy advice it implies. There are costs as well as benefits 
associated with increasing the degree of fiscal autonomy, and 
the issue of desirability is therefore an empirical one. In the 
present context, a Scottish Government that pursued a 
“greener” tax agenda than Westminster might suffer important 
adverse competitiveness effects, especially given the mobility of 
both labour and capital across the border to the rest of the UK. 
However, the overall tax burden could be held constant and, on 
the other hand, greener taxation may further stimulate 
innovation in non- carbon- intensive technologies.  
 
Increased research into the detailed costs and benefits of more 
and/ or less centralization would undoubtedly improve our 
understanding of the appropriate conduct of energy policy 
within a system of multi-level governance. We look forward to 
the outcome of the deliberations of the Calman Commission, 
which will presumably be exploring exactly these issues. 
__________________ 
 
Endnotes: 
1
Scottish CO2 emissions are estimated to be around 0.2% of global 
emissions and 0.15% of global greenhouse gas emissions due to 
human activities. (Scottish Government, 2008a). 
 
2
Under uncertainty the choice between them would be informed by the 
shapes of the marginal cost and damage functions (Wietzman, 1974). 
 
3
Helm (2005) suggests such targets may be more credible. 
 
4
Current circumstances have been christened “vile”: volatile inflation, 
less expansionary, by Michael Saunders of Citigroup. See e.g. Britann 
(2008). 
5
The Scottish Government (2008b, p3) has secured a commitment from 
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) and the National Grid 
to a review of transmission charging. 
 
6
For example, in the UK White Paper DTI (2007, footnote on p7) the 
objective is expressed as “to ensure that every home is adequately and 
affordably heated”. The objectives stated therein are the same as those 
expressed in the earlier White Paper (DTI, 2003). 
7
In DTI (2007,p7) one objective is “to promote competitive markets in 
the UK and beyond, helping to raise the rate of sustainable economic 
growth and to improve our productivity”. However, the energy sector 
does not receive any special emphasis here as a potential engine of 
growth. 
 
8
This is not to say that devolved government cannot improve the growth 
rate. For a review of the evidence see Roy (2006). 
 
9
Whether the target is to be framed in terms of CO2 or greenhouse gas 
emissions has not yet been determined. 
 
10
The Scottish Government has a commitment from Ofgem and the 
National Grid to review transmission charges. 
 
11
See, for example, McGregor, Swales and Turner 
(2008). 
____________________ 
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